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A network effect is introduced taking into account competition, cooperation, and mixed-type interaction among
agents along a generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model. It is also argued that the presence of a market capacity
undoubtedly enforces a definite limit on the agent’s size growth. The state stability of triadic agents, i.e., the most
basic network plaquette, is investigated analytically for possible scenarios, through a fixed-point analysis. It is
discovered that: (i) market demand is only satisfied for full competition when one agent monopolizes the market;
(ii) growth of agent size is encouraged in full cooperation; (iii) collaboration among agents to compete against
one single agent may result in the disappearance of this single agent out of the market; and (iv) cooperating with
two rivals may become a growth strategy for an intelligent agent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Complex networks and multiagent systems are very active
fields of research. They entail the study of networks of
interacting agents whose structure is irregular, complex, and
dynamically evolving with time [1–4]. Most real systems
in biology, chemistry, engineering, and socioeconomics, are
made up of millions and millions of interacting agents (i.e.,
atoms, electrons, people, as the case may be), which account
for fluctuations in the overall behavior of the system. Over the
years, it has also been discovered that nonlinear mathematical
models replicate the dynamics of real systems better than
linear ones [5,6]. An example of such former models is the
Lotka-Volterra model [7,8], and its generalization [9–19],
which is also known as the prey-predator model [20].
The Lotka-Volterra model has been used in various ways
to model complex systems [9–16]. For instance, in Ref. [12],
the model was used in e-commerce web sites in a competitive
scenario to explore its effects and the characteristic of rich
gets richer on the Internet economy, and the winner-takes-
all phenomenon. This was an improvement on Refs. [13,14]
where interacting agents were discovered to be sharing the
market. The Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model was generalized
in Ref. [17] through the introduction of a nonlinear, symmetric
interaction function, used to investigate a competitive scenario.
This resulted in a self-organizing clustering of agents, which
were either chaotic and/or nonchaotic in nature as a result
of their dependence on the agent’s size and their initial state
conditions. Cooperative scenarios examined in Ref. [18] were
modeled individually without imposing any market condition.
This resulted in the growth of different clusters of interacting
agents beyond their capacity in contrast to the competitive
case. A complex network representation of the competitive
and the cooperative scenarios was presented in Ref. [19], in
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order to give another description of some generalized Verhulst-
Lotka-Volterra model.
The present paper offers insights on the effects of com-
petitive and/or cooperative interaction in a multiagent system
when n agents have some common resources to share in the
market.
The main contribution of our paper is twofold: first, we
generalize the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model by introducing
a network effect through an undirected but weighted graph.
The weights suitably represent competition or cooperation.
The elements of the resulting adjacency matrix replaces the
strength parameter in the interaction function of the [17,18]
model in order to enable a mixed-type of interactions,
i.e., having a system in which competitive and cooperative
scenarios are considered to occur simultaneously among the
various interacting agents.
Second, we introduce a market capacity in the model to
replace individual agent’s capacity: this is a realistic constraint,
i.e., the maximum level that all the agents may reach in
the market, as in the Verhulst model of limited population
growth [21,22], thereby enforcing a natural (endogenous) limit
on agent’s size growth.
Such competition, cooperation, and mixed type of interac-
tions are analyzed below for triad interacting agents through
the evaluation of the eigenvalues of the relevant Jacobian
matrix computed at corresponding fixed points in order to
investigate the system stability. This triad system has been cho-
sen as the most simple, yet complex enough as representative of
basic networks [23]. Notice that the model goes well away for
the two-player prisoner (dilemma) game [24]. Thus, a mixed
type of interactions between agents, made possible through
the network effect in the generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra
model, markedly differs from previous works [17–19], and
seems more realistic.
This paper is organized as follows: in Sec. II, the generalized
Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model is discussed. Section III con-
tains the outline of the mathematical model used in this paper.
The fixed-point analysis and state stability are investigated in
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Sec. IV. In Sec. V, initial size conditions and convergence
to a steady state of the triad interacting agents are further
illustrated through simulations. We demonstrate the presence
of growth and/or decay effects in various scenarios, sometimes
rather complex, but a posteriori understandable. The paper is
concluded in Sec. VI. It appears that the model is suitable
for describing not only an economic market but other agent-
based cases such as coauthorship, or more generally team
working, or any other small or large network-based complex
systems.
II. GENERALIZED VERHULST-LOTKA-VOLTERRA
MODEL
A generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model introduced in
Ref. [17] is given by:
s˙i = αisi(βi − si) −
∑
i =j
γ (si,sj )sisj , i = 1, . . . ,n, (2.1)
where si is the size of agent i such that 0  si  1; s˙i is
its time derivative; αi is agent’s growth rate if no interaction
is present; βi is the agent’s maximum capacity; and γ (si,sj )
is the interaction function. The first term is a Verhulst-like
term [21,22] and the others stem from the Lotka-Volterra
model [7,8].
The interaction function γ (si,sj ) is defined by
γ (si,sj ) = K exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
; (2.2)
it is a continuously differentiable function that allows a
proper theoretical analysis of the system dynamics leading to
conclusions, which will appear to be likely model independent.
The positive parameter σ controls or scales the intensity of
agent size similarity and the parameter K determines the
scenarios of agent’s interaction.
The model is used in Ref. [17] to analyze a system of
n agents in competition for some common resources with
competition becoming more aggressive between agents with
similar size. This is because as |si − sj | → 0, the interac-
tion function γ (si,sj ) → K for a constant parameter σ , its
maximum value. The competition weakens when agents have
distinctly different sizes, thereby suggesting a peer-to-peer
competition modeling.
For the peer-to-peer interaction system, presented in
Refs. [17,18], a strength parameter K was introduced: K > 0
was considered to show the presence of competition in
the market, while K < 0 implied cooperation. Under the
cooperative scenario, the interaction function is defined in the
interval −K < γ (si,sj ) < 0. In order to avoid complexity and
instability of the system, the value of K was chosen carefully
through fixed-point analysis of agents with equal sizes [18],
whose eigenvalues are
λ1,...,n = K − 11 + (n − 1)K , (2.3)
so that, the K range interval − 1
n−1 < K < 0 ensures the
stability of the system.
III. MODEL
This paper is a study of the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model
when competition and cooperation can occur between linked
agents. The market capacity β becomes the amount of product
and service sales that could be reached within a certain period
of time by any agents in the market [25]. The relationship
between the individual agent’s maximum capacity βi and β is
given by
βi = β −
∑
i =j
sj , (3.1)
so that the initial Verhulst-Lokta-Volterra model becomes:
αisi(βi − si) = αisi
(
β −
∑
i=1
si
)
. (3.2)
In addition, interaction among agents is introduced and
modeled by a matrix K with elements kij = kji , which are
zero on the diagonal, and can be +1 or −1 off the diagonal.
Thus, the interaction function becomes:
γ (si,sj ) = kij exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
(3.3)
with 0 < γ (si,sj ) < |kij |.
This matrix K is the adjacency matrix of a network
represented by a weighted and undirected graph. The weights
are 0, − 1, and +1 indicate no interaction, cooperation, and
competition respectively. Furthermore, we assume that there
is no loop, that is, an agent cannot compete or cooperate with
herself. For some special matrices K, we obtain the model in
Refs. [17,18]. For instance, when
K ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 1 . . 1
1 0 . 1
. . .
. . .
1 1 . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
we obtain the full competitive scenario as in Ref. [17]. For
K ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 −1 . . −1
−1 0 . −1
. . .
. . .
−1 −1 . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦,
this is the full cooperative scenario [18]. In addition the
network matrix
K ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 k12 . . k1n
k21 0 . k2n
. . .
. . .
kn1 kn2 . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
ensures a mixed type of interaction amongst the agents in
the model, when kij (= kji) takes the value +1 or −1. That
is, when competition and cooperation occur simultaneously
among interacting agents in the system. For example, for
n = 3, in our model, we can have two agents collaborating
in order to compete effectively with the third agent. This
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can be compared with the case of two small companies
collaborating to compete against a big company, which had
previously monopolized the market or when two political
parties merge together for the purpose of winning over a
ruling (or over a potentially ruling) party in an election, or
when scientific teams or authors cooperate on some research
topics.
Thus, suppose that there exist n agents sharing some
common resources. Let us assume that agents increase in
size if they acquire some portion of the resources or have
their size reduced if any market portion is lost. Our math-
ematical model is defined by an n-dimensional differential
equation:
s˙i = αisi
(
β −
n∑
i=1
si
)
−
∑
i =j
kij exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
sisj ,
i = 1, . . . ,n, (3.4)
where si is the agent size such that 0 < si  1; s˙ is its time
derivative; αi is the growth rate of agent i if no interaction
is present; β is the market capacity and kij is the element of
the network matrix K that determines the interaction between
agent i and j . The interaction function γ (si,sj ) is composed
of dynamic parameters that result from the difference between
agents in relation; the parameter σ is a positive parameter
that regulates the difference in the agent’s size. Note that
while K indicates what interaction is present, σ determines
the range of interaction of the agents. Indeed, in contrast to
the large interaction between equal size agents, the intensity of
interactions between agents with bigger market share and those
with small market share is weak, since as | si − sj |→ ∞, the
interaction function γ (si,sj ) → 0; on the contrary, indeed,
as |si − sj | → 0, γ (si,sj ) → ±1 depending on kij , which
signifies a strong interaction between agents with similar
sizes.
For the sake of simplicity, without losing much generality,
it can be assumed that the agents have the same dynamic
properties αi = 1, while the market capacity can be β = 1.
Therefore, Eq. (3.4) becomes:
s˙i = si
(
1 −
n∑
i=1
si
)
−
∑
i =j
kij exp
[
−
(
si − sj
σ
)2]
sisj ,
i = 1, . . . ,n, (3.5)
where, as stated earlier, kij , i,j = 1, . . . ,n are elements of the
interaction matrix K.
IV. FIXED-POINT ANALYSIS AND STABILITY
In this section, the fixed-point analysis of the model is
done in order to investigate the stability of the system for all
scenarios. A triad system of agents (i.e., n = 3) was chosen
as a simple yet complex representative of a basic network,
in order to illustrate some of the properties of the model
analytically.
Suppose A1,A2, and A3 are triad interacting agents with
market sizes s1,s2, and s3 respectively, from Eq. (3.3) the
system of triads becomes:
s˙1 = s1(1 − s1 − s2 − s3) − k12 exp−(
s1−s2
σ
)2 s1s2
− k13 exp−(
s1−s3
σ
)2 s1s3, (4.1)
s˙2 = s2(1 − s1 − s2 − s3) − k12 exp−(
s2−s1
σ
)2 s2s1
− k23 exp−(
s2−s3
σ
)2 s2s3, (4.2)
s˙3 = s3(1 − s1 − s2 − s3) − k13 exp−(
s3−s1
σ
)2 s3s1
− k23 exp−(
s3−s2
σ
)2 s3s2. (4.3)
The possible K matrices for describing the different
scenarios of interaction amongst the agents A1,A2, and A3
are:
K1 =
⎡
⎣0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0
⎤
⎦, K2 =
⎡
⎣0 1 11 0 −1
1 −1 0
⎤
⎦,
K3 =
⎡
⎣ 0 −1 −1−1 0 1
−1 1 0
⎤
⎦, K4 =
⎡
⎣ 0 −1 −1−1 0 −1
−1 −1 0
⎤
⎦,
where K1 represents the matrix for a full competitive system
with three interacting agents; K2 is a matrix for mixed type
of interaction system, where one agent competes with two
other agents in cooperation. In this case, agent A1 competes
with agent A2 and agent A3 who are in cooperation. K3 is a
matrix for mixed type of interaction system, where one agent
cooperates with two other agents in competition, in this case,
agent A1 cooperates with agent A2 and agent A3 who are in
competition with each other. K4 represents the matrix for a full
cooperative system amongst the three interacting agents. It can
be observed that other cases of the mixed type of interaction
are isomorphic to the ones here presented.
The fixed-point analysis of the system entails the evaluation
of the eigenvalues of the relevant Jacobian matrix computed
at each corresponding fixed point, thus used to determine the
stability of the system. When the real part of all the eigenvalues
is negative, the system is said to be stable. If at least one
eigenvalue has a positive real part, the system is unstable.
A. Fully competitive and fully cooperative scenarios
In this section, the stability of the system under either the
fully competitive or fully cooperative scenarios is discussed,
that is, the model with network matrix K1 and K4. By
definition, a fixed point is a point in the phase space where
all the time derivatives are zero, i.e., s˙i = 0 for i = 1, . . . ,n.
The following fixed points were detected analytically from
Eqs. (4.1)–(4.3):
(I) si = 0 for i = 1,2,3, i.e., all agents with zero size;
(II) si = 1 and sj = 0 for every i = j , i.e., one agent
monopolizes the market;
(III) si = b for i = 1,2,3, 0 < b  1, i.e., all agents own
an equal share of the market.
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Moreover, it can be easily shown that the elements of the Jacobian matrix of the triads are:
[J ](i,k) = ∂s˙i
∂sk
=
⎧⎨
⎩
1 − 2si −
∑
i =j sj
{
1 + γ (si,sj )
[
1 − 2
σ 2
si(si − sj )
]}
, for k = i;
−si − siγ (si,sk)
[
1 − 2
σ 2
sk(si − sk)
]
, for k = i,
from which the stability conditions are to be found at each
fixed point.
1. Type (I) fixed point
The type (I) fixed-point analysis is the case in which all
agents have size zero, i.e., si = 0 for i = 1,2,3. The evaluated
Jacobian matrix at the type (I) fixed point, is given by:
J =
⎡
⎣1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
⎤
⎦
whose eigenvalues are all equal to 1 (i.e., λ1 = λ2 = λ3 = 1).
Therefore, it is an unstable fixed point. At this fixed point,
competition or cooperation is not applicable since all agents
are at level zero. In other words, these results do not depend
on the network matrix K .
2. Type (II) fixed point
The type (II) fixed-point analysis corresponds to the case
in which one agent eventually monopolizes the market and
satisfies the whole demand (i.e., s1 = 1); all others have size
zero (i.e., s2 = s3 = 0). Evaluating the Jacobian matrix at the
type (II) fixed point, we obtain:
J =
⎡
⎣−1 −1 − φ12 −1 − φ130 −φ12 0
0 0 −φ13
⎤
⎦,
where φij = kij exp(−σ−2), for i,j = 1,2,3 and i = j . The
eigenvalues are obtained from
(−1 − λ)(−φ12 − λ)(−φ13 − λ) = 0,
which implies that λ1 = −1, λ2 = −φ12, and λ3 = −φ13.
In the fully competitive scenario, all kij = 1 for i = j ,
thereby resulting to an all negative eigenvalues of J. Indeed,
this implies stability of the system at this fixed point.
This is applicable in real systems: if an agent monopolizes
the competitive market, the agent will ensure that such a
domination is not lost, thus keeping the market stable.
On the contrary, in the fully cooperative scenario, λ2 and
λ3 are positive, since all kij = −1,i = j , thereby making the
system unstable. This is also realistic, since in cooperation,
the ultimate goal is the maximisation of all agents gain in
the market. Therefore, it can be emphasized that monopoly
and cooperation are not compatible terms. This accounts for
systemic instability.
In conclusion, the type (II) fixed point is stable in a fully
competitive scenario because of the possibility of monopoly,
but is unstable under full cooperation.
3. Type (III) fixed point
The type (III) fixed-point analysis is the case in which all
agents are eventually owning the same share of the market,
i.e., si = b for i = 1,2,3, 0 < b < 1. When evaluating the
Jacobian matrix at this fixed point, the constant b has first to
be calculated by substituting si = b and s˙i = 0 into Eqs. (4.1)–
(4.3). From (4.1), it can be deduced that:
0 = b(1 − 3b) − (k12 + k13)b2 (4.4)
= 1 − b(3 + (k12 + k13). (4.5)
Therefore,
b = 1[3 + (k12 + k13)] . (4.6)
Similarly from (4.2) and (4.3), respectively, the following is
obtained:
b = 1[3 + (k12 + k23)] , (4.7)
b = 1[3 + (k13 + k23)] . (4.8)
Therefore, from Eqs. (4.6)–(4.8), it can be deduced that in a
fully competitive system (i.e., k12 = k13 = k23 = 1), the agent
size is b = 15 . This implies that the aggregate size of the three
agents does not reach the market maximum possible capacity,
which may be the negative result of the competition amongst
peers.
Thus, for a full competition of agents with the same size,
the Jacobian matrix with b = 15 is:
J = 1
5
⎡
⎣−1 −2 −2−2 −1 −2
−2 −2 −1
⎤
⎦,
the eigenvalues are obtained from the characteristic polyno-
mial
(−1 − λ)3 − 12(−1 − λ) − 16 = 0.
The solution to the above cubic equation is λ1 = λ2 = 1
and λ3 = −5. This shows that the system is unstable at this
fixed point. When all the agents have an equal size in a
competitive market, the system will be unstable because the
major goal of each agent is to individually dominate the
market. According to the model, agents with similar sizes
are strongly interacting; this leads to a survival of the fittest
scenario in such a competitive system, thereby making the
system unstable.
In contrast, for a cooperative system (i.e., k12 = k13 =
k23 = −1), we have b = 1, that is, collaboration makes all
agents reach the market full capacity with agent sizes as a
function of time possibly intersecting one another.
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TABLE I. Summary of analytical results under full competition
and full cooperation with φij = kij exp(−σ−2) and kij = ±1 depend-
ing on interaction between agent i and j .
Fixed-point analysis and stability
Scenario (I) si = 0 ∀i (II) si = 1, sj = 0, i = j (III) si = b ∀i
Full λ1 = 1 λ1 = −1 λ1 = 1
competition λ2 = 1 λ2 = −φ12 λ2 = 1
λ3 = 1 λ3 = −φ13 λ3 = −5
Unstable Stable Unstable
Full λ1 = 1 λ1 = −1 λ1 = −1
cooperation λ2 = 1 λ2 = −φ12 λ2 = −1
λ3 = 1 λ3 = −φ13 λ3 = −1
Unstable Unstable Stable
The corresponding Jacobian matrix for the cooperative
system with b = 1 is:
J =
⎡
⎣−1 0 00 −1 0
0 0 −1
⎤
⎦;
the eigenvalues are obtained from the equation:
(−1 − λ)3 = 0,
which implies that the system is stable, since λ1,2,3 = −1.
When all the agents with quasiequal market share cooperate,
with the collective goal of maximizing their profit (size) in
the market, the system will definitely be stable; their goal
will be achieved since the strongest possible interaction exists
amongst agents with similar sizes.
It can be noted that when b = 13 , (i.e., k12 = k13 = k23 = 0),
there exists no interaction among the triads agents of equal
sizes and this leads to the case whereby the agents share the
market equally.
In conclusion to this section, a summary of the fixed-point
analysis of our model with the network matrix K1 and K4, i.e.,
under the fully competitive and fully cooperative scenarios is
presented in Table I. In this table, it is shown that systemic
stability is observed under full competitive scenario only
when one agent monopolizes the market, but under the fully
cooperative scenario, stability occurs only when all the agents
own an equal share of the market.
B. Mixed interaction scenario
For the mixed interaction system of triads, two possible
cases can be considered; according to the number of cooper-
ation pairs the other cases can be easily found isomorphic to
these, i.e.,
(i) G2: Agent A1 is competing both with agent A2 and
agent A3, these two being in one cooperation scheme, i.e., the
model with network matrix K2. This implies that in Eqs. (4.1)–
(4.3), k12 = 1, k13 = 1 and k23 = −1.
(ii) G3: Agent A1 cooperated with both agent A2 and agent
A3, but these two are in competition, i.e., the model with
network matrix K3. Therefore, k12 = −1, k13 = −1 and k23 =
1 for Eqs. (4.1)–(4.3).
Analytically, only one fixed point was detected for the
mixed interaction of triad agents which is a case of market
duopoly. The coordinates of the fixed points are given by:
si = 1, sj = 1, sk = 0, for some i,j,k = 1,2,3, indeed, i.e.,
outlining the case of duopoly in a mixed interaction market.
1. Fixed-point analysis
For the fixed-point analysis of the two possible mixed
interaction scenarios, the Jacobian matrix is given by:
J =
⎡
⎣−2 − k12 −1 − k12 −1 − φ13−1 − k12 −2 − k12 −1 − φ23
0 0 −1 − φ13 − φ23
⎤
⎦, (4.9)
where φij = kij exp(−σ−2) and i,j = 1,2,3 for i = j . Con-
sidering the two possible cases of the mixed interaction
scenarios, two different Jacobian matrices emerge depending
on the values of each kij . When one agent competes with
two other agents, themselves in cooperation, k12 = 1, k13 = 1,
and k23 = −1, which after substitution into (4.9) leads to the
Jacobian matrix
J =
⎡
⎣−3 −2 −1 − φ13−2 −3 −1 − φ23
0 0 −1 − φ13 − φ23
⎤
⎦.
Solving the characteristic equation
(−1 − φ13 − φ23 − λ)[(−λ − 3)2 − 4] = 0
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix is obtained to be λ1 =
−5,λ2 = λ3 = −1. This signifies systemic stability under the
first case of mixed interaction scenarios with the network
matrix K2.
When one agent cooperates with two other agents, them-
selves in competition with each other, k12 = −1, k13 = −1,
and k23 = 1; substitution into (4.9) implies that the Jacobian
matrix is:
J =
⎡
⎣−1 0 −1 − φ130 −1 −1 − φ23
0 0 −1 − φ13 − φ23
⎤
⎦.
The corresponding eigenvalues obtained from
(−1 − φ13 − φ23 − λ)[(−1 − λ)2] = 0
is λ1,2,3 = −1. Hence, for the fixed-point analysis under the
second possible case of mixed interaction scenario with a
network matrix K3 in our model, stability is observed in the
system.
In conclusion of this section, for the two types of mixed in-
teractions amongst triad agents, systemic stability is observed;
this further shows the relevance of examining the coexistence
of competition and cooperation among agents in the market.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present results from numerical simula-
tions emphasizing the initial conditions and the convergence
of triad agent sets for all interesting and possible scenarios, for
each network matrix type K = {K1,K2,K3,K4}.
For the sake of clarity, in Fig. 1, the four possible scenarios
are illustrated through undirected graphs with three vertices
representing agents A1,A2, and A3 and three edges, which
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FIG. 1. Graphical illustration of the four scenarios. An edge with
solid line signifies a competitive interaction while an edge with dashed
line signifies a cooperative interaction. Pictures respectively refers to:
(a) G1, (b) G2, (c) G3, and (d) G4
signify the type of interaction amongst the agents. An edge
with solid line signifies a competitive interaction while an
edge with dashed lines signifies a cooperative interaction.
Therefore, it can be deduced that in Fig. 1, graph G1 represents
the full competitive scenario, G2 represents the first case of the
mixed interactive scenario in which agent A1 competes with
A2 and A3, themselves in cooperation. Graph G3 represents the
second case of the mixed interactive scenario in which agent
A1 cooperates with A2 and A3, themselves in competition and
G4 represents the full cooperative scenario.
We have tested different sets of initial conditions; see a few
exemplary cases in Table II. We have verified the coherence
TABLE II. Summary of the effect of initial size conditions for
the various scenarios as obtained from simulations, i.e., changing the
relative initial sizes of the agents
Scenario Initial sizes si(0) Growth (+) / Decay (−)
Full competition G1 0.1 0.2 0.4 − − +
0.1 0.4 0.2 − + −
0.4 0.1 0.2 + − −
0.4 0.2 0.1 + − −
1
2
3
0.2 0.4 0.1 − + −
0.2 0.1 0.4 − − +
0.15 0.15 0.15 + + +
0.3 0.3 0.3 − − −
Mixed interaction G2 0.1 0.2 0.4 − + +
0.1 0.4 0.2 − + +
0.4 0.1 0.2 − + +
0.4 0.2 0.1 − + +
1
2
3
0.2 0.4 0.1 − + +
0.2 0.1 0.4 − + +
0.15 0.15 0.15 − + +
0.3 0.3 0.3 − + +
Mixed interaction G3 0.1 0.2 0.4 + − +
0.1 0.4 0.2 + + −
0.4 0.1 0.2 + − +
0.4 0.2 0.1 + + −
1
2
3
0.2 0.4 0.1 + + −
0.2 0.1 0.4 + − +
0.15 0.15 0.15 + + +
0.3 0.3 0.3 + − −
Full cooperation G4 0.1 0.2 0.4 + + +
0.1 0.4 0.2 + + +
0.4 0.1 0.2 + + +
0.4 0.2 0.1 + + +
1
2
3
0.2 0.4 0.1 + + +
0.2 0.4 0.1 + + +
0.15 0.15 0.15 + + +
0.3 0.3 0.3 + + +
of results. This suggested to us to present only cases when
the initial conditions of agents sizes are rather different or
quite similar, assuming a constant parameter that controls the
size similarity, σ = 1. The dynamic change in agent’s size
and relative behavior have been observed for each scenario.
Finally, note that agent’s sizes initial conditions were chosen
within a small interval in order to allow some meaningful
interaction among the agents; since within our model, indeed,
as |si − sj | → ∞, the interaction function γ (si,sj ) → 0.
A. Fully competitive scenario (G1)
The fully competitive scenario with different initial con-
ditions for the agent’s size is observed in Fig. 2 with a
consideration on dynamical change in the agent size; the
market eventually ends in a monopoly. For all the permutations
of the initial conditions, the agent that starts with the highest
initial size, i.e., s0 = 0.4, eventually monopolizes the market
by attaining the market capacity, while the other two agents
fade out of the market. This is possible because the two agents
with smaller sizes compete too weakly with the agent that
eventually dominates the market.
On the contrary, when agent sizes are similar in Fig. 2, the
competition becomes very fierce and all agents are struggling
for their survival in the market. After some time span, it is
observed that the agents eventually have an equal share of
the market; their total market share is, however, lower than
the market capacity. Thus, strong competition among peers is
shown to lead to a reduction in the aggregate output due to the
selfish interest of the individual agents. Indeed, observe that
the final state (∑ si = 0.6). Convergence is generally slower
in the competitive scenario when compared with the other
scenarios due to the nature and effect of competition among
the interacting agents.
B. Fully cooperative scenario (G4)
The fully cooperative scenario (G4) is analyzed for different
initial sizes of the triads and illustrated in Fig 3. The
cooperation among the agents enables all agents to grow in
size up to this market capacity, thereby increasing the total
market size, which is the essence of cooperation (∑ si > 1.0).
A simple analogy can be drawn with the case of publishing
research in journals with a demand of just three papers in a
journal edition (i.e., market capacity). For simplicity, let it be
assumed that the three authors have the same quality standard
(i.e., initial condition), under full competition, each author will
have one article published making up three papers. However,
the best situation occurs under full cooperation when each
author cooperates in writing the articles; they eventually have
three papers each published to their credit. Hence, the final
result will be three papers for the editor and three papers for
each author. One other example pertains to car owners who
may own more than one car, e.g., three cars from three different
manufacturers. These simple examples show that the agents’
sizes can intersect each other during full cooperation.
The simulation leads to the same effect, even if the initial
conditions are permuted among the triads and when the agents
have similar initial sizes as shown in Fig. 3. Also, agents tend
to quickly agree, thereby converging within a short time lapse.
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FIG. 2. Fully competitive scenario (G1) with (left) different and (right) similar agent’s initial sizes.
C. Single-pair cooperation (G2)
The mixed interaction scenario (G2), when agent A1
competes with agents A2 and A3 themselves in cooperation
is shown in Figs. 4–5 for different permuted initial conditions
of agent’s sizes. It can be observed that in all simulations, the
sizes of agents A2 and A3 in cooperation grow dynamically
with time up to the market capacity but agent A1 decreases
in size until it fades out of the market. The most interesting
simulation is seen in Fig. 5, with different initial conditions
s0 = {0.4,0.2,0.1} where agent A1 initially possesses the
biggest share of the market with s1 = 0.4, competes with
the two other agents A2 and A3 that alternate a smaller
size 0.1 and 0.2. Note that the sum of the two initial
shares of the cooperating agents is lower than the share
of the competing agents. Interestingly, after some time, the
collaboration between agents A2 and A3 knocks out agent A1
from the market. An example of this scenario was experienced
in 2015 in Nigeria, where a political party that ruled the country
for 16 years after democracy was restored was defeated in
a tight competition between the incumbent president and an
aspirant that emerged from a strategic collaboration of three
smaller political parties [26]. However, this is not possible if
the intensity of interactions is very low among the agents; that
is, when A1 is extremely bigger in size when compared to
agents A2 and A3.
When all the agents have similar initial conditions, the
pattern is similar with agents A2 and A3 totally taking over
the market by growing up to the market capacity as seen in
Fig. 5.
D. Double-pair cooperation (G3)
Finally, the second possible case of mixed interaction
scenario (G3) is shown in Figs. 6–7; agent A1 cooperates with
agents A2 and A3, themselves in competition, for different
permuted initial conditions of agent’s sizes.
Here, agent A1 cooperates strongly with the agent with a
higher initial condition and cooperates weakly with the other
one. The effect of cooperation makes agent A1 (irrespective
of its initial condition) and any one of the two agents that
cooperates strongly with agent A1 grow up to the market
capacity, while the effect of weak cooperation and competition
between agents A2 and A3 makes the agent with the lowest
initial condition vanish from the market.
Surprisingly, when the three agents have the same initial
size the simulation turns out interesting also, as seen in Fig 7,
unlike the first case of mixed interaction. When agent A1
cooperates strongly with agents A2 and A3 who are in strong
competition with each other, the effect of this strong and
opposite interaction in the system results in a final state in
which no agent is attaining the market capacity, but each
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FIG. 3. Fully cooperative scenario (G4) with (left) different and (right) similar agent’s sizes.
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FIG. 4. Mixed interaction scenario (G2), A1 competes with A2 and A3 in pair cooperation, for different initial sizes.
agent nevertheless grows above its initial size; all three agents
remained active in the market.
A summary of the simulations of the triad interaction
agents is presented in Table I. The characteristic values
pertain to agent’s size initial conditions, final size, and the
time of convergence. It can be observed that convergence is
slower during competition, due to the conflicting interests of
interacting agents; in contrast, during cooperation, agents tend
to agree, thereby converging within a shorter time lapse. For the
mixed interaction cases, when agent A1 competes with agents
A2 and A3 in cooperation, a scenario with two collaborating
agents in conflict with one, the time of convergence is seen to
be faster than when agent A1 cooperates with agents A2 and A3
in competition: this can be understood due to the collaborative
effect of mixed interactions being higher in the first case than
in the second case.
E. Emphasis on the double-pair cooperation scenario (G3)
with nonsmooth evolutions
In conclusion of this section, we would like to further
emphasize the two most interesting cases G3 and G4, from
a qualitative point of view in this section, and for a practical
point of view, considering a time scale reasoning, in the next
section, Sec. V F.
It can be usually noticed that the size evolution is rather
smooth, in fact remembering the (positive or negative) logistic
behavior found from Verhulst equation. However, it is worth
emphasizing that the double-pair cooperation (G3) can lead
to a nonsmooth evolution; see Fig. 7. Observe the figure with
different initial sizes, in particular, the evolution of agent A2,
which starts with the lowest initial size. Its size first increases,
but reaches a maximum; thereafter, due to the cooperation of
agent A1 and agent A3, agent A2 is removed from the market,
even though agent A1 (which started with the biggest size)
cooperates with agent A2. In fine, A1 prefers to cooperate with
A3, and eliminate agent A2, because A1 and A3, start in the
most advantageous positions.
This situation does not need to be explicitly illustrated
with many practical cases; it occurs of course in economic
markets, such as when two top soda companies (Coca-Cola and
Pepsi-Cola) wish to control a country market. The same occurs
in scientific competition: a well-known case of war between
(USA) famous laboratories occurred after the discovery of the
high-Tc superconducting ceramics [27]. In sport, cooperation
(within theoretical competition) in order to win a race leads to
temporary cooperation; e.g., cycling races [28,29] or sumo
wrestling [30] competitions. Competition and cooperation
between political parties in order to form a coalition have
already been mentioned.
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FIG. 5. Mixed interaction scenario (G2): A1 competes with A2 and A3 in a pair cooperation, for (left) different or (right) similar initial sizes.
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FIG. 6. Mixed interaction scenario (G3), A1 cooperates with A2 and A3 in competition for different initial sizes.
The other interesting case is found when all agents start
with same sizes in Fig. 7. They all start to grow, but the two
competing agents with each other, agent A2 and agent A3, lose
their impetus to agent A1, however, cooperating with both of
them. In this case, agent A2 and agent A3 are not removed from
the market, but only reach some level yet above their initial
size. Of course, in so doing, agent A1 does not reach the full
market capacity.
This bumpy behavior is reminiscent of the behavior found
when, in the Verhulst equation, the growth rate and/or the
capacity are time dependent [31]. Such a mapping into time-
dependent extensions of the parameters in Verhulst equation
is of course outside the aim of the present paper and is left for
further work.
F. Time-scale effects
Even though qualitative aspects of cooperation and com-
petition behavior seem well described, it seems of interest to
discuss whether the control parameters of the size evolution
are reasonable. First recall that α in Eq. (2.1) was chosen to be
equal to 1. This growth rate parameter takes values of the order
of 0.04 yr−1 for steady populations, such in the USA, e.g., in
the last century. Indeed, one could estimate that the possible
bearing time of a woman was about 25 years, and during
that time she would bear one child who would be surviving.
Therefore, in a strict Verhulst model, the rise in (population)
size, going roughly from 0–1 on the size axis, and from 1–10,
on the simulation scale time axis, according to all the presented
figures, proposes a growth rate  1/10, thus roughly twice as
large as in reality.
It is easy to observe that the time scale due to the
competition parameter is rather measured through the ratio
α/kij ; see Eq. (3.4). Since we have assumed for simplicity
that kij ∼ K , the previous reasoning holds, leading to a
convincingly reasonable value of K  1 for most cooperation
or competition scenarios in real life. It seems reasonable
to consider that the simulation scale is measured in usual
time spans: years to hours. From the various examples that
we have pointed out as applications, it is obvious that the
cooperation and competition mixed cases occur over different
time horizons, thus scaling the various kij strengths.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model for compe-
tition and cooperation was extended through the introduction
of a notion hereby called market capacity, in place of the
individual agent’s own capacity, thereby imposing a limit on
the agent’s size growth. This improves previous studies in
which the agents’ capacities are modeled individually, studies
that resulted in agents unrealistically growing above their
capacity in a fully cooperative scenario.
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FIG. 7. Mixed interaction scenario(G3), A1 cooperates with A2 and A3 in competition for (left) different or (right) similar initial sizes.
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Furthermore, a network effect is introduced through undi-
rected and weighted graphs, which enable a mixed-type in-
teractive scenario, i.e., competitive and cooperative scenarios,
among the agents.
The present model has emphasized the basic plaquette of a
network, a triad system; it was chosen as a simple yet complex
representative of any network through which some properties
of the model can be investigated analytically. In addition to
this, through simulations, dynamic changes in the agent’s
size and relative behavior are observed, for all (four possible)
scenarios.
We have emphasized that the initial relative sizes of agents
is very relevant for the evolution of the system, leading to
market sharing, or sometimes removal of agents from the
market. Interesting scenarios occur even if the initial sizes
of agents are similar. When the initial sizes are quite different,
the steady state is of course more quickly reached. We have
emphasized that in some scenarios, a nonsmooth behavior can
be found. The influence of initial conditions on the coevolution
of networks has been in this respect pointed out in Ref. [32].
We consider that the model allows us to describe the
evolution of various types of agents, and is a basis for
investigating more complex networks. We have pointed out
practical cases of interest throughout the text; recall coauthor-
ship behavior in scientific publications, political manipulations
along democratic lines, the cases of sport in which individuals
from different teams can cooperate against rivals and reach a
better status, in so doing. As pointed out by Porter [33]: “The
presence of multiple rivals and strong incentives influences the
intensity of competition among firms/agents; yet, competition
and cooperation can coexist because they are on different
dimensions or because cooperation at some levels is part of
winning the competition at other levels.”
Other examples where the model can be useful may be
found, beside general aspects [34], in econophysics, such
as when there is cooperation in financial or food price
speculation [35], in auction collusions [36], or in practical
economic life, e.g., when two companies decide to team up
over the introduction of autonomous driving taxi [37].
Notice that cooperation can also be corruption [30], but
can also be used to resist speculation. The case of false, i.e.,
misleading cooperation could also be interestingly considered,
but needs further work, data, and debate.
We have provided a discussion pertaining to the possible
time scales and their measure in order to give some reasonable
range for the parameters of the model.
A final warning: it must be noticed that the interactions
are time independent and occur only among agents with size
similarities.
Beside including time dependence of the interaction param-
eters, external field effects, memory [38], and learning [39]
effects could be included in further studies. Moreover, the
simultaneous updating might be challenged for a sequential
updating in order to find more complex behaviors. In particular,
we have pointed out that destruction of agents may occur;
in contrast network growth can allow for creation of agents.
This is relevant to observe our extension of the basic VLV
modeling: the most interesting difference between the agent-
based herding model and the Lotka-Volterra model is the
possibility of investigating systems with a variable number
of agents.
Finally, asymmetric interactions, e.g., removing the con-
straint due to the square of the exponential in Eq. (2.2) would
be highly interesting. It can bein fine pointed out that the
above matrices could be asymmetric, thus sometimes with
complex eigenvalues [23], hence possibly cyclic behaviors.
Indeed, so-called alternating and cut-off ways of cooperation
can be envisaged [40]. Many developments and much work
are obviously ahead.
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